We study minimum integer representations for the weights of weighted games, which is linked with some solution concepts in game theory. Closing some gaps in the existing literature we prove that each weighted game with two types of voters admits a unique minimum integer presentation and give examples for more than two types of voters without a minimum integer representation. We characterize the possible weights in minimum integer representations and give examples for t ≥ 4 types of voters without minimum integer representations preserving types.
Introduction
Simple games, or positive switching functions, can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. Weighted voting games, or positive threshold functions, are possibly the most interesting subclass of simple games. Roughly speaking, in a weighted game a non-negative weight is assigned to each voter and a preset quota is specified, winning coalitions are those that can force a victory, i. e. the sum of their weights equal or surpass the preset quota. Weighted voting games naturally appear in several different contexts apart from voting, like reliability (see Ramamurthy [28] ) or neural networks (see Elgot [7] or Freixas and Molinero [9] ) among other technological fields.
The number of simple games on a fixed set N = {1, . . . , n} is finite, of course, but it grows very rapidly with an increasing number of voters n since we are dealing with sets of sets. Indeed, every family of pairwise independent subsets of N can serve as the set of minimal winning coalitions defining a simple game. Two subsets are independent if neither contains the other. Families of independent subsets are sometimes called "Sperner families", "coherent systems", or "clutters", and their enumeration and classification have occupied mathematicians since Dedekind in the 19th century. In his 1897 work he determined the exact number of simple games with four or fewer players. Since that time simple games have been investigated in a variety of different mathematical contexts. An account of some these works will be found in: Sperner [30] , Isbell [15] , Golomb [13] , Muroga et al. [24, 25] , Hoeffding [14] , Shapley and Shubik [29] , Dubey and Shapley [4] , Kurz and Tautenhahn [20, 21, 31] , Freixas and Molinero [10, 11] , Krohn and Sudhölter [19] , Keijzer et al. [17, 18] . Although the number of weighted games compared with simple games is small, it grows very rapidly and there are no enumerations for more than nine voters.
Integer representations are very common in practice and minimum integer representations, if they exist, constitute the most efficient way to represent weighted games. Geometrically, the set of equivalent integer representations of a weighted game depicts an unbounded cone with either a vertex or without it. Hence, a natural question arises. For which weighted games exists a minimum weighted representation? Or, in other words, for which weighted games its associated integer cone has a vertex? Symmetric games, i. e. games where all players have an equivalent role in the game and therefore characterized by one single type of equivalent voters, admit a unique minimum integer representation. But, it is known that it does not always exist a unique minimal representation in integers for a weighted game. Muroga et al. [24] in their exhaustive enumeration of threshold functions (or, equivalently, weighted games) uncovered several cases with as few as eight players in which two symmetric players must be given different weights in a minimal integer representation; e. g. [12;7,6,6,4,4,4,3,2] = [12;7,6,6,4,4,4,2,3] . Moreover, they verified that all weighted games with less than eight players admit a minimum integer representation.
Their example has four types of players (a type here is an element of a partition of N formed by equivalent voters), and each type contains players with the same weights excepting for the last type, which contains players with weights 3 and 2. To our knowledge it is not known whether there exist weighted games without a unique representation in integers with less than either two or three types of players. The main goal of this paper is to ascertain what occurs for these two cases, filling the existing gap in the theory of weighted games. Previously to the Muroga et al.'s example, Isbell [15] had exhibited a remarkable 12-player example in which the affected players are not symmetric. Thus, even if we additionally require that all players of equal type have equal weights, the existence of a unique minimum integer representation preserving types is not necessarily implied. Similar questions emerge to be important in this more restrictive context. Freixas and Molinero [10, 11] uncovered several cases with as few as 9 players and checked the nonexistence of such examples for less than 9 players, see also [20] . All the examples they listed have at least 5 types of players. It concerns us to ascertain what occurs for less than 5 types. We would like to remark that homogeneous games admit a unique minimal representation as shown by Ostmann [26] .
A natural third purpose emerges to be significant, whenever it does not exist a minimum integer representation for a weighted game in either of the two above described situations. In these situations, at least two integer representations become minimal, but is it possible to generate weighted games with more than two minimal representations? And, further, is it possible to construct a weighted game with some established number of minimal integer representations? As far as we know, all the examples showed until now without minimum integer representations (either preserving types or not) have only two minimal elements. Additional results we introduce here concern: bounds on the number of non-isomorphic weighted games depending on the number of voters and on the number of types of voters, and the existence of a weighted game in minimum integer representation for any pair of two coprime integer weights.
Minimum integer representations of weighted games are important in game theory: Peleg [27] proved that for homogeneous weighted decisive games the nucleolus (a well-known solution concept in game theory) coincides with the minimum integer representation preserving types. Also in the cases where there are several minimum sum integer representations preserving types there are connections linking minimal integer realizations with the least core (another solution concept in game theory) and the nucleolus of weighted decisive games [19] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we precisely define the classes of complete simple games and weighted games. For complete simple games we state a parameterization theorem by Carreras and Freixas in Subsection 2.1, which completely characterizes these objects up to isomorphism using linear inequalities. The subclass of weighted games can be defined via the non-emptiness of certain polytopes as outlined in Subsection 2.2. The precise details of minimum integer representations are stated in Subsection 2.3. In Section 3 we present constructions for weighted games without a unique minimum integer representation for small t (Subsection 3.1) or with those with more than two minimum integer representations (Subsection 3.2). In Subsection 3.3 we study the question which weights may occur in a minimum integer representation. Our main theorem, that each weighted game with two types of voters admits a unique minimum integer representation, is given in Section 4. Some extra information on the enumeration or bounds on the number of weighted games which emerge from our previous results or complete those results are stated in Section 5. We end with a conclusion in Section 6.
Weighted voting games and complete simple games
So far we have informally defined weighted games via their weights w i and their quota q. As mentioned in the introduction there are several representations for the same weighted game, e. g. all represent the same weighted game because the subsets of N whose weights equal or surpass the quota are invariant for all of them. So it makes sense to have a closer look at the underlying discrete structure. From a very general point of view one can describe voting methods using Boolean functions χ :
, 1}, where we may replace the subsets of N (called coalitions in the voting setting) by its characteristic function to obtain a genuine Boolean function. χ(U ) = 1 has the meaning that coalition U is winning. Assuming χ(∅) = 0, χ(N ) = 1, and χ(U \{u}) ≤ χ(U ) for all u ∈ U leads to simple games (positive switching functions, positive or monotone Boolean functions). A simple game will be denoted from now on by (N, χ). A well studied subclass of simple games (and superclass of weighted games) arises from Isbell's desirability relation [16] : We write i j for two voters i, j ∈ N iff we have χ {i} ∪ U \{j} ≥ χ(U ) for all j ∈ U ⊆ N \{i} with the meaning that voter i is at least as influential as voter j. A pair (N, χ) is called complete simple game if it is a simple game and the binary relation is a total preorder. We abbreviate i j, j i by i j and assume 1 2 · · · n. For an extensive overview on voting methods we refer the interested reader to [32] .
Whenever i j voter i is as influential (strong) in the game as voter j, meaning that it does not matter which one of both takes part in a coalition. So we can partition the whole set N of voters into equivalence classes N 1 , . . . , N t and say that the complete simple game consists of t types of voters. By n i we denote the cardinality of the set N i for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. The type of a coalition is formed by a set of coalitions and can be described by a vector (m 1 , . . . , m t ) meaning m i -out-of-n i voters (from the set N i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We can transfer the monotonic order ≤ via
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and the remaining part of the partial order via
We call the minimal vectors in this poset which are winning shift-minimal winning coalitions and the maximal vectors which are losing shift-maximal losing coalitions. A complete simple game is uniquely characterized be the set W s of its shift-minimal winning coalitions or the set L s of its shift-maximal losing coalitions. W.l.o.g. we mainly deal with types of coalitions, i. e. sets of coalitions, instead of coalitions and for this reason also call the vector (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m t ) coalition.
As an example we consider the weighted game [4; 3, 2, 1, 1] (which is the same as [3; 2, 1, 1, 1]), where we have 1 2 3 4 for the voters, i. e. n 1 = 1 and n 2 = 3. The shift-minimal winning coalitions are given by (1, 1), (0, 3) and the shift-maximal losing coalitions are given by (1, 0), (0, 2). Since (1, 2) (1, 1) the coalition type (1, 2) is also winning and (0, 2) is losing due to (0, 2) (0, 3).
A parameterization theorem for complete simple games
Carreras and Freixas have given an entire and non-redundant parameterization of complete simple games in [3] . Therefore by m i m j we denote the situation where neither m i m j nor m i m j holds, i. e. m i , m j are non-comparable coalitions. Additionally we denote the (decreasing) lexicographic order by .
Theorem 2.1.
(a) Given are a vector n = n 1 . . . n t ∈ N t >0
and a matrix
satisfying the following properties
(iii) for each 1 ≤ j < t there is at least one row-index i such that m i,j > 0, m i,j+1 < n j+1 , and
Then, there exists a complete simple game (N, χ) associated to ( n, M).
(b) Two complete games ( n 1 , M 1 ) and ( n 2 , M 2 ) are isomorphic if and only if n 1 = n 2 and
In such a vector/matrix representation of a complete simple game the number of voters n is determined by
n i . Although Theorem 2.1 looks technical at first glance, the necessity of the required properties can be explained easily. Obviously, n j ≥ 1, m 1,1 > 0, and 0 ≤ m i,j ≤ n j must hold for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ t. If m i m j or m i m j then we would have m i = m j or either m i or m j cannot be a shift-minimal winning coalition. If for a column-index 1 ≤ j < t we have m i,j = 0 or m i,j+1 = n j+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, then check that g h for all g ∈ N j , h ∈ N j+1 , which is a contradiction to the definition of the classes N j and therefore also for the numbers n j . Obviously a complete simple game does not change if two rows of the matrix M are interchanged. Thus we must require an arbitrary ordering of the rows to avoid duplicities.
We would like to remark that for t = 1 only r = 1 is possible and the requirements reduce to 1 ≤ m 1,1 ≤ n 1 = n. Also for t = 2 one can easily give a more compact formulation for the requirements in Theorem 2.1. A complete description of the possible values n 1 , n 2 , m 1,1 , m 1,2 corresponding to a complete simple game with parameters n, t = 2, and r = 1 is given by
For t = 2 and r ≥ 2 such a complete and compact description is given by
Recognizing weighted games
To decide whether complete simple games are weighted, we can utilize linear programs, see [32] for an overview on other methods. A complete simple game is weighted if and only if the following system of linear inequalities is feasible:
By introducing another variable q for the quota the number of inequalities can be reduced:
Since no integer variables are used so far these two linear programming formulations can be checked for feasibility in polynomial time. If the sum of weights is minimized the weights are integral or have very small denominators (at least for n ≤ 9) nevertheless, see [20] . So one can obtain small integer representations very quickly. Introducing integer variables changes the linear programs to integer linear programs, whose solution is N P -hard in general. To our knowledge there is no known polynomial time algorithm to determine minimum sum integer representations. For some algebraic techniques we refer the interested reader to [2] . We would like to remark that those complete simple games which are not weighted can be represented as a finite intersection or union of weighted voting games, a construction which is also used in practice [8] .
Minimum integer representations
An integer realization [q; w 1 , . . . , w n ] is called minimum integer representation if for all integer realizations [q ; w 1 , . . . , w n ] of the same game we have w i ≤ w i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If we restrict the allowed representations to those where the voters of the same equivalence class N i have an equal weight, we speak of minimum integer representations preserving types. In general, both representations need not exist and indeed in this paper we study conditions where they exist and give examples where they do not exist. An integer realization [q; w 1 , . . . , w n ] is called minimum sum representation if we have w(N ) ≤ w (N ) for all integer realizations [q ; w 1 , . . . , w n ] of the same game, where w(U ) is additively defined on the elements of U . If the integer realizations are restricted as before, we speak of minimum sum representations preserving types.
As mentioned before, minimum integer representations need not to exist and we will prove that they exist for some subclasses of weighted games or give examples of weighted games without minimum integer representations in the following subsections. Therefore we refrain that an integer representation [q; w 1 , . . . , w n ] represents a certain weighted game if and only if we have i∈U w i ≥ q and i∈U w i ≤ q − 1.
for each winning coalition U and each losing coalition U .
We would like to note that the existence of a minimum integer representation for a weighted game implies the existence of a minimum integer representation preserving types, but the converse is not true. The example [12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 3, 2] = [12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 2, 3] from the introduction has [14; 8, 7, 7, 5, 5, 5, 3, 3] as a minimum representation preserving types.
Generating conspicuous examples of games without a minimum integer representation
Having in mind that one knows the existence of weighted games without a unique minimum integer representation for all t > 3, we are concerned in this section with this problem in the special case of t = 3 types of voters. As we shall see below, we propose a procedure to generate weighted games with three types of voters without a minimum integer representation based on the famous Coin-Exchange Problem of Frobenius [1] .
Similarly, the existence of weighted games without a unique minimum integer representation preserving types is known for all t > 4. Thus the case t = 4 is under study here and we also propose a procedure to generate weighted games with four types of voters without a minimum integer representation preserving types.
Another objective of this section is to generate examples of weighted games with more than two minimal integer representations.
The last goal concerns weighted games with a unique minimum integer representation of coprime weights.
Weighted voting games without a unique minimum integer representation for small t
For t ≥ 3 equivalence classes of voters there are examples of weighted games without a unique minimum integer representation and for t ≥ 4 there are examples without a unique minimum integer representation preserving types. Here we present some new constructions for such weighted games based on the famous Coin-Exchange Problem of Frobenius [1] : Consider n ≥ 2 integers 0 < a 1 < · · · < a n with gcd(a 1 , . . . , a n ) = 1 as denominations of n different coins. The amount of money N that can be represented by using arbitrary multiples x i of the given coins is given by N = n i=1 a i x i , where the x i are non-negative integers.
If a 1 > 1 some amounts N can not be represented. The largest such N for a given problem is called the Frobenius number g(a 1 , . . . , a n ). Well known results in this context are g(a 1 , a 2 ) = (a 1 −1)(a 2 −1)−1 and that exactly For our first construction we choose two coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 as weights w 2 and w 3 , see Theorem 3.3, and integers q, w 1 such that q − w 1 is not representable using a, b, whereas q − 2w 1 + 1 is, and we additionally have w 1 − 1 > b. For n = 2 a b we consider the weighted games q; w 1 − . Minimizing w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , or the quota q yields the solution (35; 11.5, 7, 5) . In this example the minimum integer sum representation is given by (35; 12, 11, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5) , where the first two weights may be swapped.
For t = 4 types of voters we base our construction on the fact that there are no non-negative integers fulfilling 7u + 11v ∈ {52, 59} but that there are integers fulfilling 7u + 11v = 52 + 59 − 7 · 11 + 1 and consider the following example: n = 1 1 7 11 , . Minimizing w 2 yields the solution (77; 25, 17, 11, 7) and minimizing w 3 , w 4 , or q yields the solution (77; 25, 18, 11, 7). Thus both (77; 25, 17, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7) and (77; 24, 18, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7) are minimum sum representations preserving types.
Weighted voting games with more than two minimal integer representations
It would be nice to have an example of a weighted game with more than two different minimum sum representations preserving types. Our first idea was to choose t = 4, two coprime integers w 3 , w 4 , and n = 1 1 w 4 w 3 . We call an integer k representable if there are non-negative integers u, v fulfilling uw 3 + vw 4 = k. If there would exist integers 0 < l 2 < l 1 − 1 < w 3 w 4 such that l 1 , l 1 + 1, l 2 , l 2 + 1 are not representable but w 3 w 4 − l 1 − l 2 + 2 is representable, then we would obtain such an example with
Unfortunately there is Popoviciu's theorem which has the following consequence: For an integer k ∈ [1, w 3 w 4 ] not being divisible by w 3 or w 4 , exactly one of the numbers k and w 3 w 4 − k is representable. So there are u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 with
is not representable. For t = 5 we have another construction which works: Proposition 3.1. Let a, b be two coprime positive integers with a > b. We call an integer k representable if there exist non-negative integers u, v with ua + vb = k. Suppose we have integers l 1 < l 2 < l 3 fulfilling
The weighted game (ab; w 1 , w 2 + 1, w 3 + 1, a, . . . , a, b, . . . , b), n = 1 1 1 b a has the following three minimum sum representations preserving types:
(1) (ab; w 1 , w 2 + 1,
PROOF. Let w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 , w 5 be valid weights with quota q. From the corresponding inequality system we can deduce q ≥ ab, w 4 ≥ q b ≥ a, and w 5 ≥ q a ≥ b. For b > 3 we can assume equality in a minimum sum representation. Since l i +1 is representable there exist non-negative integers with
≥ ab we have w 1 + u 1 w 4 + v 1 w 5 ≥ q which is equivalent to w 1 ≥ w 1 . If l 1 would be representable we would have w 1 + l 1 ≤ q − 1 which is equivalent to w 1 ≤ w 1 . For i = 2, 3 we have w i + l i ≥ q and w i + l i − 1 ≤ q − 1. The later inequality is equivalent to w i ≤ w i + 1. The first inequality would be equivalent to w i ≥ w i + 1. But since l i is not representable we have only w i + l i + 1 ≥ q which is equivalent to w i ≥ w i .
For i = 2, 3 we do not have w 1 + w i ≤ w 1 + w 2 + 1 since l 1 + l i − ab is not representable but may have w 1 + w i ≥ w 1 + w i + 1. Since l 2 + l 3 − ab is not representable we do not have w 2 + w 3 ≥ w 2 + w 3 + 2 but may have w 2 + w 3 ≤ w 2 + w 3 + 2.
Since l 1 + l 2 + l 3 + 1 − 2ab is representable and w 1 + w 2 + 1 + w 3 + 1 + (ab − w 1 − w 2 − w 3 − 2)
=l1+l2+l3−ab+1
≥ ab we have w 1 + w 2 + w 3 + (ab − w 1 − w 2 − w 3 − 2) ≥ q, so that w 1 + w 2 + w 3 ≥ w 1 + w 2 + w 3 + 2.
An example where the requirements of the previous proposition are fulfilled is given by a = 17, b = 13, l 1 = 157, l 2 = 161, l 3 = 174, w 1 = 63, w 2 = 59, and w 3 = 46.
A smaller example is given by a = 13, b = 11, l 1 = 93, l 2 = 97, l 3 = 106, w 1 = 49, w 2 = 45, and w 3 = 36.
Furthermore we have the following straightforward generalization:
Proposition 3.2. Let a, b be two coprime positive integers with a > b and t be an integer with t ≥ 2. We call an integer k representable if there exist non-negative integers u, v with ua + vb = k. Suppose we have integers
l ij − (z − 1)ab < ab is not representable for all 2 ≤ z < t and all subsets {i 1 , . . . , i z } ⊆ {1, . . . , t} of cardinality z, and
The weighted game (ab; w 1 , w 2 + 1, . . . , w t + 1, a, . . . , a, b, . . . , b), n = 1 . . . 1 b a has the following t minimum sum representations preserving types:
• (ab; w 1 , w 2 + 1, . . . , w t + 1, a, . . . , a, b, . . . , b)
• (ab; w 1 + 1, w 2 , w 3 + 1 . . . , w t + 1, a, . . . , a, b, . . . , b) • . . .
• (ab; w 1 + 1, . . . , w t−1 + 1, w t , a, . . . , a, b, . . . , b)
For t ≥ 4 we have the following examples: Being a bit careless one might conjecture that for a given t every weighted games can have at most t − 2 different minimum sum representations preserving types and that this bound is tight.
Possible weights of minimum integer representations
Instead of asking which classes of weighted games admit a unique minimum integer representation or a unique integer representation preserving types one can ask which weights are possible in a minimum integer representation. The following theorem and remarks completely resolve this question for two different weights except exact lower bounds on the number of necessary voters n. where n 1 ≥ a + 1 (2a + 1) and n 2 ≥ b + 1 (2b + 1), is in minimum weighted representation.
PROOF. Let two integers
] is a representation of the same game. Due to ua + vb < q, ab ≥ q, and ba ≥ q we have ua + vb ≤ q − 1, ab ≥ q , and ba ≥ q . Multiplying the first inequality by ab yields abua + abvb ≤ ab
Adding bv times the second inequality and au times the third inequality yields
Thus we conclude− q ≤− q, which is equivalent to q ≥ q. Next we deduce b ≥ b and a ≥ a from ab ≥ q ≥ q = ab and ba ≥ q ≥ q = ab.
Now let us assume that q ; b 1 , . . . , b n1 , a 1 , . . . , a n2 represents the same game, where
As before we conclude
a n2−i ≥ q ≥ q = ab we obtain a n2−b+1 ≥ a, where equality holds if and only if a n2−b+1 = · · · = a n2 = a. So we have a i ≥ a for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n 2 in the case of equality. Otherwise we have
which would contradict minimality. Similarly we deduce b i ≥ b for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 . (4) The lower bounds on n 1 and n 2 can be improved, e. g. based on the knowledge of u and v.
There is a generalization to weighted games with more than two types of voters:
Theorem 3.5. Let a 1 , . . . , a t be integers such that a 1 > a 2 > · · · > a t > 0 and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t there is an index 1 ≤ j ≤ t with gcd(a i , a j ) = 1. where n i ≥ 1 + 2 max j a j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, is in minimum weighted representation.
PROOF. For each index 1 ≤ i ≤ t choose a suitable index j = i such that gcd(a i , a j ) = 1. Let z be the integer defined via q = a i a j z and two integers u, v be uniquely defined via ua i + va j = a i a j − 1, where 0 ≤ u ≤ a j − 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ a i − 1. With this, new weights a 1 , . . . , a t , and a new quota q we have
Combining these inequalities with the vectors a i v a i − v , a j a j − u u , and
Analogously to the proof of the previous theorem we can treat the case of different weights within equivalence classes of voters.
In the next Theorem we pay less restrictive conditions on the weights a i by a quite large bound on the number of voters n. For new weights a 1 , . . . , a t and a new quota q the following inequalities have to be valid:
PROOF. Let t integers u i be uniquely defined via
Summing up a i u i times the ith inequality plus q times the last inequality yields q ≥ q. Using this at the ith inequality gives a i ≥ a i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Analogously to the proofs of the previous theorems we can treat the case of different weights within equivalence classes of voters.
Obviously the condition gcd(a 1 , . . . , a t ) = 1 is necessary. If we also want to use zero weights we can utilize the next lemma: 
Weighted voting games with minimum integer representations for two types of voters
As we have remarked in the introduction, all complete simple games with just one type of voters, t = 1, are weighted and admit a unique minimum integer representation with all weights being equal to 1. These games are called symmetric, anonymous or k-out-of-n-games in the literature. In the previous section the allowable values for "t" for possible minimum integer representations for weighted games has been narrowed, since for t = 3 there are weighted games without a unique minimum integer representation. So the central question of this section (and the paper) is: what occurs for two types of voters. We first state the main result and immediately after we prove it.
Theorem 4.1. Each weighted game with two types of voters admits a unique minimum integer representation, where w 1 ≤ max(n 1 + 1, n 2 ), w 2 ≤ max(n 1 , n 2 − 1), and q ≤ (n 1 + n 2 ) · max(n 1 + 1, n 2 ). For r ≥ 2 the bounds can be sharpened a bit to 1 ≤ w 1 ≤ n 2 , 0 ≤ w 2 ≤ n 1 , and w 2 + 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n 1 n 2 .
Proof of the main theorem for r = 1
Capturing the different compact descriptions of complete simple games with t = 2 for r = 1 and r ≥ 2 via linear inequalities, we start with the case of one shift-minimal winning coalition. Theorem 4.2. For a weighted game (n 1 , n 2 ), ((m 1 , m 2 )) with two types of voters, i. e. t = 2 and r = 1, there exist a unique minimum integer representation.
PROOF. Since the game is weighted there are some restrictions on the parameters m 1 , m 2 , so that we utilize case differentiation. Let the weights be given by a 1 , . . . , a n1 and b 1 , . . . , b n2 . We have a i ≥ b j + 1 for all
At first, we determine those complete simple games which are not weighted. For 1 ≤ m 1 ≤ n 1 − 1 and 2 ≤ m 2 ≤ n 2 − 2 both coalitions (m 1 − 1, m 2 + 2) and (m 1 + 1, m 2 − 2) are losing coalitions so that we conclude a i > b j + b h and a i < b j + b h for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 and 1 ≤ j < h ≤ n 2 , which is a contradiction. The remaining complete simple games are weighted and we determine their unique minimum integer representations. In the following we also speak of losing vectors instead of losing coalitions.
We can easily check that a 1 = · · · = a n1 = 1, b 1 = · · · = b n2 = 0, q = m 1 represents the game and is the unique minimum integer representation.
Since (m 1 , 0) and (m 1 − 1, n 2 ) are losing vectors, we can conclude b i ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n 2 and a i ≥ n 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 . We can easily check that a 1 = · · · = a n1 = n 2 , b 1 = · · · = b n2 = 1, q = m 1 n 2 + 1 represents the game and thus is the unique minimum integer representation.
If m 1 + n 2 − 1 ≤ n 1 the shift-maximal losing coalitions are given by (m 1 + n 2 − 2, 0) and (m 1 − 1, n 2 ). Comparing the first shift-minimal losing coalition with the shift-minimal winning coalition and inserting a i ≥ b j + 1 yields b j ≥ n 2 − 1 and a i ≥ n 2 . We can easily check that a 1 = · · · = a n1 = n 2 ,
2 represents the game.
If m 1 + n 2 − 1 > n 1 the shift-maximal losing coalitions are given by (n 1 , m 1 + n 2 − 2 − n 1 ) and (m 1 − 1, n 2 ). Comparing the first shift-maximal losing coalition with the shift-minimal winning coalition and inserting a i ≥ b j + 1 yields b j ≥ n 1 − m 1 + 1 and a i ≥ n 1 − m 1 + 2. We can easily check that
•
is the unique minimum representation. Otherwise the only shift-maximal losing coalitions are (n 1 , m 2 − 1) and (n 1 − 1, n 2 ). From the winning coalition (n 1 , m 2 ) and the losing coalition (n 1 , m 2 − 1) we deduce b i ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n 2 . With this we deduce from the winning coalition (n 1 , m 2 ) and the losing coalition
We can easily check that equality is possible, so that a i = n 2 −m 2 +1, b j = 1, q = n 1 (n 2 −m 2 +1)+m 2 is the unique minimum representation.
Proof of the main theorem for r > 1
To circumvent some case differentiations in the remaining part we now completely handle the cases where null voters, i. e. voters i such that χ(U ) = χ(U ∪ {i}) for all subsets U ⊆ N , occur. PROOF. In this case the game has only one shift-minimal winning coalition and we can apply the previous theorem.
Lemma 4.4. The weight of a null voter is 0 in every minimum integer representation of a weighted game and each non-null voter has a weight of at least 1 in every integer representation.
PROOF. Replacing the weight to 0 decreases weights and keeps the representation valid. The only integral weight being smaller than 1 is zero, which would lead to a null voter.
In order to prove that each weighted game with two types of voters admits a unique minimum integer representation, we provide a lemma that allows us to restrict our considerations onto the cases, where only two (possibly non-integral) weights are used.
Lemma 4.5. For a given weighted game with two types of voters, r ≥ 2, and without null voters, let W s be the set of shift-minimal winning coalitions, L s be the set of shift-maximal losing coalitions, and w = (w 1 , w 2 )
T be a weight vector. If there exist integers w 1 , w 2 , q such that ( w 1 , w 2 , q) is an optimal solution of the following three linear programs, where c ∈ { (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}, and [ q; w 1 , . . . , w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w 2 ] is a representation of the game, then this representation is a minimum weighted integer representation. 
By w 1 we denote the arithmetic mean of the a i and by w 2 the arithmetic mean of the b i . We have m
s , w 1 ≥ w 2 + 1, w 2 ≥ 1, and w 1 , w 2 , q ≥ 0. By considering the minimization of w 1 , w 2 , and q (in all three linear programs) we conclude w 1 ≥ w 1 , w 2 ≥ w 2 , q ≥ q and can assume that equality holds (otherwise the assumed integral representation is component-wise larger or equal to our special integer representation).
Since for each feasible linear program there exists at least one vertex, where the optimal solution is attained, we conclude: There have to be at least three inequalities in the linear programs, where the solution (w 1 , w 2 , q ) leads to equality. We call those inequalities tight inequalities.
Since we assume w 1 = w 1 , w 2 = w 2 , and q = q, the arithmetic means and the quota q have to be integers. Due to
a i either we have a 1 = · · · = a n1 = w 1 or a 1 ≥ w 1 + 1 and a n1 ≤ w 1 − 1.
Analogously we have either
then we must have l 1 = n 1 since otherwise the l 1 largest a i would violate the inequality. In such a case we have |W s | = 1, which contradicts r ≥ 2. Thus we can assume that no such inequality is tight. Since w 1 ≥ 2 and w 2 , q ≥ 1, there is at least one tight inequality of type m T w ≥ q for m T = (m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ W s . Thus we have m 1 = n 1 since otherwise the m 1 smallest a i would violate the inequality. This also means that there is exactly one inequality of type m T w ≥ q, which is tight, and that we have w 2 = 1, w 1 = w 2 + 1 = 2. This would be a contradiction to a n1 > b 1 . Now let us assume b 1 ≥ w 2 + 1 and
s then we must have m 2 = n 2 since otherwise the m 2 smallest b i would violate the inequality.
If l T w ≤ q − 1 is a tight inequality for l T = (l 1 , l 2 ) ∈ L s then we must have l 2 = n 2 since otherwise the l 2 largest b i would violate the inequality. Both cases, that m T w ≥ q and l T w ≤ q − 1 are tight, cannot occur simultaneously since otherwise we could conclude w 1 ≤ 1, which is not possible. Additionally there can be at most one such tight inequality. Thus the inequalities w 1 ≥ w 2 + 1 and w 2 ≥ 1 must be tight so that we have w 2 = 1 and w 1 = w 2 + 1 = 2, which contradicts a n1 > b 1 .
Thus finally we can conclude a 1 , . . . , a n1 ≥ w 1 = w 1 , b 1 , . . . , b n2 ≥ w 2 = w 2 , and q ≥ q.
Having this lemma at hand it remains to prove that the three linear programs, without integrality conditions and consisting of three variables, from Lemma 4.5, have a common integral optimum solution for the three stated target functions. This means that there is a unique integral solution which minimizes the target functions
Lemma 4.6. The inequality w 1 ≥ w 2 + 1 is redundant in Lemma 4.5 without w 2 ≥ 1.
With this we conclude
which is equivalent to w 1 ≥ (n 2 − b)
s and conclude
which is equivalent to
Lemma 4.7. For |W s | = r ≥ 2 the inequality w 2 ≥ 1 is redundant in Lemma 4.5.
PROOF. Let (a, b) ∈ W s with minimal a. Due to |W s | = r ≥ 2 we have b > 0 and (a, b − 1) ∈ L s . Thus we have aw 1 + bw 2 ≥ q ≥ aw 1 + (b − 1)w 2 + 1, from which we conclude w 2 ≥ 1.
So each optimal vertex of the linear program in Lemma 4.5 is determined by three tight inequalities of one of the types m T w ≥ q or l T w ≤ q − 1, since w 1 , w 2 , q ≥ 0 can not be attained with equality. In the following three lemmas we consider the possible cases. Let us have a closer look at the corresponding inequality system again:
For the basis (w 1 , w 2 , q) the inverse matrix is given by
If we can show that all entries of M −1 are non-negative then we have w 1 ≥ w 1 , w 2 ≥ w 2 , and q ≥ q for all feasible (w 1 , w 2 , q).
Since Q = 1 we can choose e = a − u, f = b + v. With this we have Let us have a closer look at the corresponding inequality system again:
Since Q = 1 we can choose a = c + u, b = d − v. With this we have PROOF. Combine the previous lemmas (the case |W s | = r = 1 is dealt directly).
From the last theorem we can directly conclude our main theorem 4.1.
Remark 4.12. Due to the above lemmas we can determine the unique minimum integer representation in O |W s | 3 log(n 1 + n 2 ) log log(n 1 + n 2 ) + |W s | 2 log 2 (n 1 + n 2 ) log log(n 1 + n 2 ) time. Therefore we consider all pairs of shift-minimal winning coalitions and all pairs of shift-maximal losing coalitions (|L
due to Inequalities (2)) and calculate the parameters u and v via the Euclidean algorithm to determine the third tight coalition. So we have to consider less than |W s | 2 + |L s | 2 cases. In each case the Euclidean algorithm performs at most log(n 1 + n 2 ) steps where numbers between −n 1 − n 2 and n 1 + n 2 are added and divided. After solving the 3 × 3-equation system, which can be done in time O(log(n 1 + n 2 ) log log(n 1 + n 2 )), we only have to check if the solution is feasible. Checking the feasibility means determining the minimal weight of a winning coalition and the maximal weight of a losing coalition, which can be done using O(|W s |) multiplications and additions. Since the minimal possible values of w 1 , w 2 , and q can be bounded via w 1 ≤ max(n 1 + 1, n 2 ), w 2 ≤ max(n 1 , n 2 − 1), and q ≤ (n 1 + n 2 ) · max(n 1 + 1, n 2 ) we may also determine a minimal integer representation by trying out all possibilities, which results in a pseudo-polynomial algorithm.
Due to the famous LLL-algorithm [22, 23] integer linear programs with a fixed number of dimensions, i. e. the number of variables, and a fixed number of constraints can be solved in polynomial time. For a two variables integer program defined by m constraints involving coefficients with at most s bits there is a O(m + log m log s)M (s) algorithm [6] , where M (s) is the time needed for s-bit integer multiplication (we assume M (s) = s log s log log s). For t = 2 types of voters we have
, so that m = |W s |·|L s |+n ∈ O(n 2 ), and s ∈ O(log n) using the ILP formulation without the quota q. For a general but fixed number of variables Clarkson's sampling algorithm needs an expected number of O(m + s log m) arithmetic operations [5] . Using the ILP formulation with an extra variable for the quota q we have m = |W s |+|L s |+n ∈ O n t−1 and s ∈ O(log n) for t types of voters. We would like to remark that the number of shift-minimal winning coalitions can be exponential in n whenever the number t of types of voters is not restricted, see e. g. [19] .
Enumerations and bounds for the number of weighted games
Besides from studying properties of complete simple games and weighted games one can also enumerate these special classes of cooperative games for small numbers of players n. In some cases enumeration results provide a deeper understanding. So far the number of complete simple games of weighted games is only known up to n = 9, see e. g. [10, 21] . Additionally restricting the parameters t (the number of types of voters) and/or r (the number of shift-minimal winning coalitions) opens the possibility to determine enumeration formulas in some cases. A widely known result in this context is csg(n, 1) = wvg(n, 1) = n, where csg(n, t) denotes the number of complete simple games with n voters partitioned into t equivalence classes. Similarly wvg(n, t) denotes the number of weighted games with n voters occurring in t different types. In [12] the authors have determined the formula cs(n, 2) = F ib(n + 6) − (n 2 + 4n + 8), where F ib(n) denotes the Fibonacci numbers, see also [21] for an alternative proof. So we know that cs(n, t) is at least exponential in n for t ≥ 2. In this section we want to show that the situation changes for weighted games by proving a polynomial upper bound on wm(n, t) in Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3. It remains a task to come up with an exact formula for wm(n, 2).
If we refine our counts to the numbers csg(n, t, r) and wvg(n, t, r) by additionally considering the number r of shift-minimal winning coalitions, more results can be obtained. In [21] an algorithm is given to principally determine an exact formula for csg(n, t, r) whenever t and r are fixed. So far it is not known whether this can also be done for the number wvg(n, t, r) of weighted games with t types of voters and r shift-minimal winning coalitions. For r = 1 it is not too difficult to come up with such enumeration formulas as we will demonstrate for t = 2. Having an exact characterization of the weighted games with t = 2 and r = 1 at hand, see the proof of Theorem 4.2, we can easily determine a formula for their number:
Corollary 5.1. The number wm(n, 2, 1) of weighted games with t = 2 and r = 1 is given by n − 1 for n ≤ 2 and 2(n − 2) 2 + 2 for n ≥ 3.
If we skip the parameter r then we can only state upper bound:
PROOF. Due to the bounds in the minimum integer representation for r ≥ 2 in Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 5.1 the number wm(n, 2) of weighted games with n voters and two types of voters is upper bounded by
Thus multiplying vertex v i with g yields integer weights w i between 0 and (t − 1)!(n − 1)
. There are at most (tn)
possible tuples of integer weights to be considered. The quota can be chosen as the minimum weight of a winning coalition. Since there are less than n t possibilities for the numbers n i of voters in the t equivalence classes the proposed upper bound on wm(n, t) follows.
Conclusion
The main result of this paper proves that weighted games with two types of players admit a unique minimum integer representation. On the contrary, for three types of players we generate examples without a unique integer representation. The addition of these two results to those already known allows us to conclude that a weighted game with k types of voters admits a minimum integer representation if and only if k < 3.
Concerning weighted representations preserving types we found examples of weighted games with 4 types of voters without a unique representation in integers. Nevertheless, it is still an open problem to elucidate whether weighted games with 3 types of voters admit a unique minimum representation in integers. To this end we have tried to generalize our technique from Subsection 4.2, i. e. we may consider the linear program minimizing the sum of the weights and have a closer look at the corners of the corresponding polytope, which are characterized by four equations corresponding to four tight coalitions (shift-maximal losing or shift-minimal winning coalitions).
As demonstrated in Subsection 4.2 for three tight coalitions, the resulting weights and the quota could be fractional. But using the extended Euclidean algorithm we were able to construct another coalition with contradicts the tightness of the starting three coalitions in these cases. For four tight coalitions (and the variables q, w 1 , w 2 , and w 3 ) we may go along the same lines and use the extended Euclidean algorithm for three integers in order to deduce some restrictions on quadruples of tight coalitions. This indeed works, but there still remain cases where the optimal LP solution is fractional. By generating random weighted games with three types of voters we have discovered several such examples, some of them are given below. For each example we state the sizes of the equivalence classes n = n 1 n 2 n 3 , the minimum non-integral weights w = w 1 w 2 w 3 q , and the minimum integral weights w = w 1 w 2 w 3 q :
(1) n = 9 62 71 , w = 38.3 22.6 6.6 154.3 , w = 46 27 8 185 Originally we have obtained the values of w by minimizing w 1 + w 2 + w 3 but it turned out that in all of these (and the other found) cases we have a unique minimum integer representation preserving types, so that minimizing w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , or q would yield the same result. We would like to remark that we have also found some example where only one value is non-integral. Although, in our experiments the only occurring denominators were 2, 3, and 5, we do not think that the denominator is bounded by a constant. So far we have a very poor probabilistic model which generates those examples with a very low probability. Nevertheless we have a strong feeling that each weighted game with three types of voters admits a unique minimum integer representation preserving types. As a small justification we would like to remark that we have tried some specific parametric constructions which provable do not contain counter examples.
So at this point we leave this challenging question open for the interested reader and hope that our specific examples might help to get some useful insights. One can get a first glimpse of the difficulty of this problem by comparing the values of w and w in our examples.
Weighted voting games with an arbitrary number of minimal integer representations have been generated. Moreover, some bounds have been obtained for the number of non-isomorphic weighted games depending on the number of voters and on the number of types of voters, and the existence of a weighted game, in minimum integer representation for any pair of two coprime integer weights, has been determined.
Other interesting open problems in the context of this paper are the question for a weighted game with a unique integer minimum sum representation, but without a minimum integer representation, and the question for a polynomial time algorithm to determine minimum sum integer representations for weighted games or a proof that this problem is N P -hard.
Another important line of research would be to study links between minimum representations of weighted games and some one-point solution concepts, like nucleolus, least core, etc., see e. g. [19, 27] .
